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Abstract — Outsourcing sensitive and crucial data in
the hands of a cloud provider should come with the
guarantee of security and seamless availability for
data at rest, in motion, and in use. Several
alternatives exist for storage services, while data
confidentiality solutions for the database as a service
paradigm are still immature. We propose a novel
architecture that integrates cloud database services
with data confidentiality and the possibility of
executing concurrent operations on encrypted data.
This is the first solution supporting geographically
distributed clients to connect directly to an
encrypted cloud database, and to execute concurrent
and independent operations including those
modifying the database structure. The proposed
architecture has the further advantage of
eliminating intermediate proxies that limit the
elasticity, availability, and scalability properties that
are intrinsic in cloud-based solutions. The efficacy of
the proposed architecture is evaluated through
theoretical analyses and extensive experimental
results based on a prototype implementation subject
to the TPC-C standard benchmark for different
numbers of clients and network latencies.
Keywords — Cloud, security, confidentiality,
SecureDBaaS, database
I. INTRODUCTION
Ensuring data security and confidentiality is an utmost
important while placing critical information is placed in
infrastructures of untrusted third parties. [1]. This
requirement imposes clear data management choices:
original plain data must be accessible only by trusted
parties that do not include cloud providers,
intermediaries, and Internet; in any untrusted context,
data must be encrypted. Satisfying these goals has
different levels of complexity depending on the type of
cloud service. There are several solutions ensuring
confidentiality for the storage as a service paradigm,
while guaranteeing confidentiality in the database as a
service (DBaaS) paradigm is still an open research area.
In this context, we propose SecureDBaaS as the first
solution that allows cloud tenants to take full advantage
of DBaaS qualities, such as availability, reliability, and
elastic scalability, without exposing unencrypted data to
the cloud provider.
The architecture design was motivated by a threefold
goal: to allow multiple, independent, and
geographically distributed clients to execute concurrent
operations on encrypted data, including SQL statements
that modify the database structure; to preserve data
confidentiality and consistency at the client and cloud
level; to eliminate any intermediate server between the
cloud client and the cloud provider. The possibility of
combining availability, elasticity, and scalability of a
typical cloud DBaaS with data confidentiality is
demonstrated through a prototype of SecureDBaaS that
supports the execution of concurrent and independent
operations to the remote encrypted database from many
geographically distributed clients as in any unencrypted
DBaaS setup. To achieve these goals, SecureDBaaS
integrates existing cryptographic schemes, isolation
mechanisms, and novel strategies for management of
encrypted metadata on the untrusted cloud database.
This paper contains a theoretical discussion about
solutions for data consistency issues due to concurrent
and independent client accesses to encrypted data. In
this context, we cannot apply fully homomorphic
encryption schemes [2] because of their excessive
computational complexity.
The SecureDBaaS architecture is tailored to cloud
platforms and does not introduce any intermediary
proxy or broker server between the client and the cloud
provider. Eliminating any trusted intermediate server
allows SecureDBaaS to achieve the same availability,
reliability, and elasticity levels of a cloud DBaaS. Other
proposals (e.g., [3], [4]) based on intermediate server(s)
were considered impracticable for a cloud-based
solution because any proxy represents a single point of
failure and a system bottleneck that limits the main
benefits (e.g., scalability, availability, and elasticity) of
a database service deployed on a cloud platform. Unlike
SecureDBaaS, architectures relying on a trusted
intermediate proxy do not support the most typical
cloud scenario where geographically dispersed clients
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can concurrently issue read/write operations and data
structure modifications to a cloud database.
A large set of experiments based on real cloud
platforms demonstrate that SecureDBaaS is
immediately applicable to any DBMS because it
requires no modification to the cloud database services.
Other studies where the proposed architecture is subject
to the TPC-C standard benchmark for different numbers
of clients and network latencies show that the
performance of concurrent read and write operations
not modifying the SecureDBaaS database structure is
comparable to that of unencrypted cloud database.
Workloads including modifications to the database
structure are also supported by SecureDBaaS, but at the
price of overheads that seem acceptable to achieve the
desired level of data confidentiality. The motivation of
these results is that network latencies, which are typical
of cloud scenarios, tend to mask the performance costs
of data encryption on response time. The overall
conclusions of this paper are important because for the
first time they demonstrate the applicability of
encryption to cloud database services in terms of
feasibility and performance.
Figure 1: SecureDBaas
II. ARCHITECTURE DESIGN
SecureDBaaS is designed to allow multiple and
independent clients to connect directly to the untrusted
cloud DBaaS without any intermediate server. Fig. 1
describes the overall architecture. We assume that a
tenant organization acquires a cloud database service
from an untrusted DBaaS provider. The tenant then
deploys one or more machines (Client 1 through N) and
installs a SecureDBaaS client on each of them. This
client allows a user to connect to the cloud DBaaS to
administer it, to read and write data, and even to create
and modify the database tables after creation.
We assume the same security model that is commonly
adopted by the literature in this field, where tenant users
are trusted, the network is untrusted, and the cloud
provider is honest-but-curious, that is, cloud service
operations are executed correctly, but tenant
information confidentiality is at risk. For these reasons,
tenant data, data structures, and metadata must be
encrypted before exiting from the client. A thorough
presentation of the security model adopted in this paper
is in Appendix A, available in the online supplemental
material.
The information managed by SecureDBaaS includes
plaintext data, encrypted data, metadata, and encrypted
metadata. Plaintext data consist of information that a
tenant wants to store and process remotely in the cloud
DBaaS. To prevent an untrusted cloud provider from
violating confidentiality of tenant data stored in plain
form, SecureDBaaS adopts multiple cryptographic
techniques to transform plaintext data into encrypted
tenant data and encrypted tenant data structures because
even the names of the tables and of their columns must
be encrypted. SecureDBaaS clients produce also a set
of metadata consisting of information required to
encrypt and decrypt data as well as other administration
information. Even metadata are encrypted and stored in
the cloud DBaaS.
SecureDBaaS moves away from existing architectures
that store just tenant data in the cloud database, and
save metadata in the client machine or split metadata
between the cloud database and a trusted proxy [5].
When considering scenarios where multiple clients can
access the same database concurrently, these previous
solutions are quite inefficient. For example, saving
metadata on the clients would require onerous
mechanisms for metadata synchronization, and the
practical impossibility of allowing multiple clients to
access cloud database services independently. Solutions
based on a trusted proxy are more feasible, but they
introduce a system bottleneck that reduces availability,
elasticity, and scalability of cloud database services.
SecureDBaaS proposes a different approach where all
data and metadata are stored in the cloud database.
SecureDBaaS clients can retrieve the necessary
metadata from the untrusted database through SQL
statements, so that multiple instances of the
SecureDBaaS client can access to the untrusted cloud
database independently with the guarantee of the same
availability and scalability properties of typical cloud
DBaaS. Encryption strategies for tenant data and
innovative solutions for metadata management and
storage are described in the following two sections.
Data Management
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We assume that tenant data are saved in a relational
database. We have to preserve the confidentiality of the
stored data and even of the database structure because
table and column names may yield information about
saved data. We distinguish the strategies for encrypting
the database structures and the tenant data.
Encrypted tenant data are stored through secure tables
into the cloud database. To allow transparent execution
of SQL statements, each plaintext table is transformed
into a secure table because the cloud database is
untrusted. The name of a secure table is generated by
encrypting the name of the corresponding plaintext
table. Table names are encrypted by means of the same
encryption algorithm and an encryption key that is
known to all the SecureDBaaS clients. Hence, the
encrypted name can be computed from the plaintext
name. On the other hand, column names of secure
tables are randomly generated by SecureDBaaS; hence,
even if different plaintext tables have columns with the
same name, the names of the columns of the
corresponding secure tables are different. This design
choice improves confidentiality by preventing an
adversarial cloud database from guessing relations
among different secure tables through the identification
of columns having the same encrypted name.
SecureDBaaS allows tenants to leverage the
computational power of untrusted cloud databases by
making it possible to execute SQL statements remotely
and over encrypted tenant data, although remote
processing of encrypted data is possible to the extent
allowed by the encryption policy. To this purpose,
SecureDBaaS extends the concept of data type, that is
associated with each column of a traditional database
by introducing the secure type. By choosing a secure
type for each column of a secure table, a tenant can
define fine-grained encryption policies, thus reaching
the desired trade-off between data confidentiality and
remote processing ability. A secure type is composed of
three fields: data type, encryption type, and field
confidentiality. The combination of the encryption type
and of the field confidentiality parameters defines the
encryption policy of the associated column.
The data type represents the type of the plaintext data
(e.g., int, varchar). The encryption type identifies the
encryption algorithm that is used to cipher all the data
of a column. It is chosen among the algorithms
supported by the SecureDBaaS implementation. As in
[9], SecureDBaaS leverages several SQL-aware
encryption algorithms that allow the execution of
statements over encrypted data. It is important to
observe that each algorithm supports only a subset of
SQL operators. These features are discussed in
Appendix C, available in the online supplemental
material. When SecureDBaaS creates an encrypted
table, the data type of each column of the encrypted
table is determined by the encryption algorithm used to
encode tenant data. Two encryption algorithms are
defined compatible if they produce encrypted data that
require the same column data type.
Metadata Management
Metadata generated by SecureDBaaS contain all the
information that is necessary to manage SQL
statements over the encrypted database in a way
transparent to the user. Metadata management strategies
represent an original idea because SecureDBaaS is the
first architecture storing all metadata in the untrusted
cloud database together with the encrypted tenant data.
SecureDBaaS uses two types of metadata.
 Database metadata are related to the whole database.
There is only one instance of this metadata type for
each database.
 Table metadata are associated with one secure table.
Each table metadata contains all information that is
necessary to encrypt and decrypt data of the associated
secure table.
This design choice makes it possible to identify which
metadata type is required to execute any SQL statement
so that a SecureDBaaS client needs to fetch only the
metadata related to the secure table/s that is/are
involved in the SQL statement. Retrieval and
management of database metadata are necessary only if
the SQL statement involves columns having the field
confidentiality policy equal to database. This design
choice minimizes the amount of metadata that each
SecureDBaaS client has to fetch from the untrusted
cloud database, thus reducing bandwidth consumption
and processing time. Moreover, it allows multiple
clients to access independently metadata related to
different secure tables
Database metadata contain the encryption keys that are
used for the secure types having the field confidentiality
set to database. A different encryption key is associated
with all the possible combinations of data type and
encryption type. Hence, the database metadata represent
a keyring and do not contain any information about
tenant data.
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Figure 2: Structure of table metadata
The structure of a table metadata is represented in Fig.
2. Table metadata contain the name of the related
secure table and the unencrypted name of the related
plaintext table. Moreover, table metadata include
column metadata for each column of the related secure
table. Each column metadata contain the following
information.
 Plain name: the name of the corresponding column of
the plaintext table.
 Coded name: the name of the column of the secure
table. This is the only information that links a column
to the corresponding plaintext column because column
names of secure tables are randomly generated.
 Secure type: the secure type of the column, as defined
in Section 3.1. This allows a SecureDBaaS client to be
informed about the data type and the encryption
policies associated with a column.
 Encryption key: the key used to encrypt and decrypt all
the data stored in the column.
SecureDBaaS stores metadata in the metadata storage
table that is located in the untrusted cloud as the
database. This is an original choice that augments
flexibility, but opens two novel issues in terms of
efficient data retrieval and data confidentiality. To
allow SecureDBaaS clients to manipulate metadata
through SQL statements, we save database and table
metadata in a tabular form. Even metadata
confidentiality is guaranteed through encryption. The
structure of the metadata storage table is shown in Fig.
3. This table uses one row for the database metadata,
and one row for each table metadata.
Figure 3 Organisation of database metadata and table
metadata
III. RELATED WORK
SecureDBaaS provides several original features that
differentiate it from previous work in the field of
security for remote database services.
 It guarantees data confidentiality by allowing a cloud
database server to execute concurrent SQL operations
(not only read/write, but also modifications to the
database structure) over encrypted data.
 It provides the same availability, elasticity, and
scalability of the original cloud DBaaS because it does
not require any intermediate server. Response times are
affected by cryptographic overheads that for most SQL
operations are masked by network latencies.
 Multiple clients, possibly geographically distributed,
can access concurrently and independently a cloud
database service.
 It does not require a trusted broker or a trusted proxy
because tenant data and metadata stored by the cloud
database are always encrypted.
 It is compatible with the most popular relational
database servers, and it is applicable to different DBMS
implementations because all adopted solutions are
database agnostic.
Cryptographic file systems and secure storage solutions
represent the earliest works in this field. We do not
detail the several papers and products (e.g., Sporc [6],
Sundr [7], Depot [8]) because they do not support
computations on encrypted data.
IV. CONCLUSION
We propose an innovative architecture that guarantees
confidentiality of data stored in public cloud databases.
Unlike state-of-the-art approaches, our solution does
not rely on an intermediate proxy that we consider a
single point of failure and a bottleneck limiting
availability and scalability of typical cloud database
services. A large part of the research includes solutions
to support concurrent SQL operations (including
statements modifying the database structure) on
encrypted data issued by heterogenous and possibly
geographically dispersed clients. The proposed
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architecture does not require modifications to the cloud
database, and it is immediately applicable to existing
cloud DBaaS, such as the experimented PostgreSQL
Plus Cloud Database, Windows Azure, and Xeround.
There are no theoretical and practical limits to extend
our solution to other platforms and to include new
encryption algorithms.
REFERENCES
[1] M. Armbrust et al., “A View of Cloud Computing,”
Comm. of the ACM, vol. 53, no. 4, pp. 50-58, 2010.
[2] W. Jansen and T. Grance, “Guidelines on Security
and Privacy in Public Cloud Computing,” Technical
Report Special Publication 800-144, NIST, 2011.
[3] A.J. Feldman, W.P. Zeller, M.J. Freedman, and
E.W. Felten, “SPORC: Group Collaboration Using
Untrusted Cloud Resources,” Proc. Ninth USENIX
Conf. Operating Systems Design and Implementation,
Oct. 2010.
[4] J. Li, M. Krohn, D. Mazie`res, and D. Shasha,
“Secure Untrusted Data Repository (SUNDR),” Proc.
Sixth USENIX Conf. Opearting Systems Design and
Implementation, Oct. 2004.
[5] P. Mahajan, S. Setty, S. Lee, A. Clement, L. Alvisi,
M. Dahlin, and M. Walfish, “Depot: Cloud Storage
with Minimal Trust,” ACM Trans. Computer Systems,
vol. 29, no. 4, article 12, 2011.
[6] H. Hacigu¨mu¨ s¸, B. Iyer, and S. Mehrotra,
“Providing Database as a
Service,” Proc. 18th IEEE Int’l Conf. Data Eng., Feb.
2002.
[7] C. Gentry, “Fully Homomorphic Encryption Using
Ideal Lattices,” Proc. 41st Ann. ACM Symp. Theory of
Computing, May 2009.
[8] H. Hacigu¨mu¨ s ,¸ B. Iyer, C. Li, and S. Mehrotra,
“Executing SQL over Encrypted Data in the Database-
Service-Provider Model,” Proc. ACM SIGMOD Int’l
Conf. Management Data, June 2002.
[9] R.A. Popa, C.M.S. Redfield, N. Zeldovich, and H.
Balakrishnan, “CryptDB: Protecting Confidentiality
with Encrypted Query Processing,” Proc. 23rd ACM
Symp. Operating Systems Principles, Oct. 2011.
